Values by Schlag, Pierre
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities




Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh
Part of the History Commons, and the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale
Journal of Law & the Humanities by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
julian.aiken@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation




Justice, goodness, rightness, truth, fairness, efficiency, order, progress,
freedom, equality, security, tolerance, neutrality, community, honesty,
loyalty, convenience, clarity, precision, comprehensiveness, consistency,
rationality, elegance, rigor. These are just some of the key political,
ethical, and aesthetic values of contemporary American law.
Much of American legal thought is dedicated to the identification and
classification of these values in terms of rank, intensity, scope, compatibili-
ty, and commensurability. These values are analyzed, clarified, system-
atized, reconciled, balanced, sacrificed, overcome, and overwhelmed. Their
implications are traced. They are deployed to support or attack sundry
agendas. They are used to justify, redeem, uplift, motivate, command, and
defeat. They feature at all stages in legal arguments: in their origins, their
frames, their development, and their terminus.
Throughout all these various uses of values, there is one thing that is not
much talked about: the action of valuation, the generative history of values.
What is missing is any historical recollection of how these particular values
came to be values for us, individually and collectively. Instead, values
stand as an autonomous realm: values are severed from their generative
history and their generative history is effaced. Indeed, ironically, values
become values for us precisely through this process of severance and
effacement. In American law, we can see this ongoing process of
severance and effacement at work in two pervasive rhetorics, which I will
call the presentist rhetoric and the rhetoric of the romanticized past.
In the presentist rhetoric, legal thinkers depict and deploy values as the
unquestionable rhetorical origins, the ultimate animating agencies, and the
discursive limits of legal conversations. "Justice requires . . ." they say.
"Equality requires . . ." they say. In this kind of rhetoric, values become
the self-evident starting points and grounds of legal conversations. In this
jurisprudential world, it is at once impossible and beside the point to ask
about the generative history of value or values. It is impossible because
* © Pierre Schlag, 1994. All rights reserved. For comments and criticisms, I wish to thank David
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values are taken to be self-evidently self-grounding and it is presumed that
participants in the legal conversation already take values to be the primary
source of authority.
In the rhetoric of the romanticized past, the generative history of values
is supplanted by a mythic and highly idealized rendition of the authorial
moment-the moment at which values become accepted as values. In this
rhetoric, generative history is reduced to discrete authorial moments. For
instance, the authoring of values in American law is ascribed to mystical
foundational moments (e.g., "1789"), to venerated authoritative texts (e.g.,
"The Constitution"), to politically revered authors (e.g., "The Framers"), or
to the sophisticated constructions of moral and political philosophy (e.g.,
John Rawls's "original position").' These accounts of how values have
become values for us are not histories. They are, rather, "reconstructions"
wishfully projected back on a temporal or philosophical past to create the
origins we presently desire our values to have. Typically the authors
represented in these "reconstructions" are very much like the idealized
representations we have of ourselves. They give "reasons." They engage
in "dialogue" and "conversation." They are "deliberative." These
"reconstructed" authors are, in short, instantiations of the rational, coherent,
relatively autonomous subject of liberal thought.2
Both the presentist rhetoric and the rhetoric of the romanticized past
succeed in severing values from their generative history and effacing that
history. This ahistoricism is not a remediable conceptual defect in what we
take to be values. Rather, it is constitutive of the aesthetic frame within
which "values" emerge as values for us. It is through the severance and
effacement of values from the valuing action and the valuing agencies that
values become what they are for us: abstract idealizations cast as context-
transcendent, regulative grounds.
Values are grounds to the extent that they are shared within a community
and to the extent that they establish the shared identities and self-definitions
that make dialogue and deliberation possible. Abstraction enables members
of a community to bracket non-essential differences. The idealized
character of values serves as a rhetorical medium to command at least
minimal consensus and minimal reciprocal recognition among members of
the community.
Values are context-transcendent to the extent that they enable judgment
or evaluation in a variety of different situations and circumstances. The
abstract character of values establishes the possibility of context-transcen-
1. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
2. This liberal subject is such a pervasive aesthetic prefiguration of American legal thought that its
role in the formation of various schools of American legal thought has gone virtually unnoticed. See
Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (1991).
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dence, while the idealized character of values legitimates abstraction from
the concrete specifics of particular contexts.
Values are regulative to the extent that they control or at least influence
outcomes. As regulative grounds, values serve to identify and circumscribe
the possible rhetorical resources that can be used and the decisions that can
be reached by a community or its members.
To describe values as context-transcendent, regulative grounds in this
way is to give a fairly conventional account of values.3 Indeed, it is a
flattering account inasmuch as it accords a powerful and normatively
pleasing place to values and value-talk. This account is consonant with
many of the goods often associated with values and value-talk. It is
consonant, for instance, with Martha Nussbaum's account of values.4
Hence, when Nussbaum writes that the abstraction of values means "there
is something very important that binds us, whether we feel like it or not,"
she is referring to the regulative character of values.5 When she says that
the appeal to abstract values "is a way of stopping debate by saying that
there is something unchanging out there," she is referring to the fact that
values are grounds.6 When she writes "that there are ethical standards that
are independent of the norms and traditions of a particular culture," she is
appealing to the context-transcendent character of values.7 And when
Martha Nussbaum writes that the appeal to abstract values "can help us to
systematize our beliefs and preferences," she is recognizing that values play
a very significant role in organizing our normative universe.
8
Indeed, one may trace many of the good and valuable uses conven-
tionally ascribed to values and value-talk to the character of values as
context-transcendent, regulative grounds. What is more difficult and
possibly more important to recognize is that the constitution of values as
context-transcendent, regulative grounds also harbors danger. This danger
is traceable to precisely the same constitutive characteristics that make
values seem appealing, important, and powerful in the first place.
The danger is that one might be led to ascribe a rhetorically foundational
status to values and value-talk. Given that values are context-transcendent,
regulative grounds, one might easily come to believe that value-talk or
value advocacy is, a priori, morally or politically significant. This seems
reasonable, but it is a non sequitur. Simply because values are, in and of
themselves, constructed so as to have moral or political consequences does
3. Much of this account tracks CHAIM PERELMAN, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON
ARGUMENTATION 74-80 (1971).
4. Martha Nussbaum, Valuing Values: A Case for Reasoned Commitment, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
197 (1994).
5. Id. at 211.
6. Id. at 210.
7. Id. at 214.
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not mean that they necessarily or even usually have those moral or political
consequences. The recognition that values are constructed as context-
transcendent, regulative grounds might seem to establish a relation between
"values" and their contexts, but it does not. To understand the relations
between "values" and the contexts in which they are invoked, one cannot
look merely at how "values" are constructed. It is also necessary to
examine the contexts in which the "values" are invoked. To understand
this point is crucial. It is crucial because the context within which a value
is invoked may well be constructed in such a way as to deny, diffuse,
exhaust, or even reverse the moral or political charge of that value.
For example, Martha Nussbaum ascribes all sorts of virtuous uses to
values and value-talk. She says:
values are binding on us
values limit and stop debate
values are transcultural and enduring
values enable systematization of our preferences and commitments.9
Now one can certainly imagine contexts in which the effective presence of
cultural resources (i.e., "values") that are binding, that help limit and stop
debate, that transcend cultures, and that enable systematization of preferen-
ces would be helpful or desirable. But one can also easily imagine contexts
in which the effective presence of such cultural resources (i.e., "values")
would be extremely unhelpful and undesirable.
If the binding, debate-stopping, culture-transcendent, and preference-
systematizing characteristics of "values" are considered virtues, it is only
because their context has been prefigured to render them virtues. Indeed,
in some contexts, these virtues quickly become vices:
values are binding on us values are authoritarian
values limit and stop debate values are silencing
values are transcultural values are totalizing
values enable systematization values enable reductionism
The point here is that regardless of the particular constitutive characteristics
of a value, one cannot tell whether its use is salutary without understanding
how that value is used and in what context. The moral or aesthetic
consequences of the invocation of a value cannot be discerned merely from
an examination of the constitutive characteristics of that value. Nor is this
point merely "academic." On the contrary: ours is a world where
compassion for AIDS victims can be used just as easily to sell clothing as
to elicit funding for medical research, a world where the value of freedom
implies at once the downfall of the Berlin wall and the imbibing of Pepsi.'
9. Id. at 211, 210, 214, 215.
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In order to conclude that the invocation of values or value-talk has
significant moral or aesthetic consequences, one would have to know
something about the ontological status of "values" in any given context.
Specifically, one would have to know whether, in any given context, the
values exist in the mode of illusion, fantasy, image, idea, cognitive determi-
nation, linguistic inscription, cultural formation, biological given, objective
reality, some other modality, or some combination of the above.1'
Similarly, in order to conclude that the invocation of values or value-talk
has moral or aesthetic consequences, one would have to know something
about the performative role values play in any given context: persuasive,
disciplinary, coercive, rationalizing, justifying, shaming, organizing, some
other role, or some combination of the above.
Nor does it do any good to restrict the object of inquiry, in the manner
of some analytical moral philosophy and much American jurisprudence, to
"proper" or "authentic" or "normal" uses of "values," leaving non-
conforming uses to the disciplinary oblivion of some devalued site labelled
"improper" or "inauthentic" or "aberrant." Such devices are familiar
enough in American intellectual life. They are used over and over again
to delimit the object of inquiry and to define intellectual jurisdiction in a
way that will allow formalization of the field of investigation. 2 We know











That the intellectual jurisdiction and aesthetic configuration of many of our
disciplines (including much analytical moral philosophy and American
jurisprudence) is grounded on and delimited by such devices is not cause
for confidence. Rather, it is reason to doubt the intellectual integrity of
those disciplines.
Indeed, to say that a discipline will speak only about the "proper" uses
of values, leaving "improper" uses to some degraded and unexamined
11. One would also have to know what hold any of these modalities have within the particular
culture in which the values are invoked.
12. For a critical discussion of the rhetorical effects of this kind of device (the internal/external
perspective) in American legal thought, see Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139
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realm, is to say that a discipline will only study the values it has defined
into existence for itself. It is no doubt a fine thing for a discipline to
devote itself to the study of its own posited creations (here, values), but this
procedure is not without certain risks-risks of disciplinary solipsism.
Once a discipline (like much analytical moral philosophy or American
jurisprudence) dedicates itself to the study of its own posited creations, two
questions become critically important. First, it becomes necessary to ask:
What is the ontological status of the posited creations (here values) studied
by the discipline? Second, one needs to ask whether there are any
interesting relations at all (and if so, which ones) between what those
within the discipline call the posited creations (here values) and human life
generally.
So the questions remain: What is the ontological status of values in any
given context? What is the performative role of values in any given
context? In one sense, one would think that these questions would be of
interest to those who are concerned with the moral efficacy of their own
value-talk. Similarly, one would think that these questions would be of
interest to those who are interested in what lawyers do. 3
But value-talk-whether in analytical moral philosophy or American
jurisprudence--does not and cannot answer these questions. It cannot
answer these questions because the very practice, the very plausibility, of
value-talk already presupposes an answer to these questions. What value-
talk presupposes is that it is already constituted as an intellectually serious
and morally efficacious enterprise (and so too, therefore, are its posited
creations-values). Before one can indulge in such optimistic and self-
congratulatory presuppositions, however, it is necessary to understand what
values and value-talk are and how they are related in any given instance to
social and legal practices.
I. THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF VALUES
To describe values as context-transcending, regulative grounds does not
establish or specify their ontological status; that is, this description does not
establish or specify the manner or the modalities of being in which values
are. Hence, as previously suggested, it does not establish whether values
are in the mode of illusion, fantasy, image, idea, cognitive determination,
linguistic inscription, cultural formation, biological given, objective reality,
some other modality, or almost any combination of the above to varying
degrees.
13. As Robert Cover put it, 'To live in a legal world requires that one know not only the precepts
but also their connections to possible and plausible states of affairs." Robert Cover, The Supreme Court,
1982 Term Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 (1983).
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To say, as has been said here, that values are idealized abstractions or
that they are context-transcending, regulative grounds does not answer the
ontological question. One must remember that God too once was (and in
some senses, still is) an idealized abstraction. He too once was (and in
some senses, still is) regulative and context-transcending, indeed, the all-
time ground for evaluation. But, of course, these attributions of essential
traits to "God" do not, indeed cannot, establish in what manner of being he
was (or is). In this respect, values are his pantheistic successors in interest.
Values are like little divinities. 4 Like God, they serve as grounds or
unquestioned origins. Like God, their invocation demands worship,
reverence, and self-abnegation. Like God, they provide comfort and
compensation for an otherwise degraded reality. Like God, they enable the
widespread belief in a hopeful, eschatological trajectory for law, politics,
and human existence. In short, "values" are the secular equivalent of
God-they are the continuation of theology by other means.
What then is the ontological status of these divinities in any given
context? It is important to answer this question because the ontological
status of these divinities will affect what one thinks of them and what can
be done with them. It is important to be able to discern in any given
context to what extent values are ontologically deep and to what extent
they are ontologically superficial. Values are ontologically deep to the
extent that they constitute the dominant forms of being of an individual or
a group. Conversely, values are ontologically superficial to the extent that
they are relegated to subordinate or derivative forms of being of an
individual or a group.' 5 If in a given context, values and value-talk are
ontologically superficial-for instance, if they are a kind of epiphenomenal,
normatively pleasing illusion akin to magical thinking-then participating
in value-talk on its own terms is probably not intellectually interesting. If,
by contrast, in a given context, values are ontologically deep--for instance,
if they are sedimented cultural formations that constitute the very way in
which our social and intellectual lives are fashioned-then engaging in
value-talk might well be not only intellectually interesting, but even
morally or politically important.
The identification of the ontological status of values in any given
instance will help fashion an appropriate orientation towards the invocation
of "values": committed participation, pious reverence, sustained skepticism,
intellectual disengagement, strategic use, or still some other orientation.
Now, making determinations about the ontological depth or superficiality
14. See KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES 298-301 (1969). "The Romans knew that you
could get a god merely by taking an adjective and transforming it into an abstract noun. ... And
particularly, they would detach some attribute from another god, and set it up as a separate divine
abstraction. Fides, Libertas, Victoria, Virtus, Felicitas..." Id. at 301.
15. This is a very rough cut at the conceptualization of relations that are much more complicated
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of values may seem complicated (and very often it is), presenting difficult
questions of philosophy, social theory, and aesthetics. Instead of dealing
with these difficult questions, consider first as an easy, illustrative case the
difference between the ontology of values in Sophocles's Antigone and the
ontology of values in a Mobil Oil advertisement.
In Sophocles's play, the value of loyalty to family so pervades the being
of Antigone that she deliberately brings disaster not only upon herself, but
upon her father and upon the state. We do not doubt the depth of
Antigone's valuation of loyalty to family precisely because we see the
extreme pain that she is willing to create in vindicating this loyalty to
family. By contrast, the professed commitment to values contained in
Mobil ads is designed to achieve strategic advantages largely (if not
entirely) unrelated to the observance or realization of those professed
values.16 We understand this point implicitly-indeed, without effort-be-
cause we understand implicitly the character of corporate advertising. What
gives the Mobil ad away, of course, is not some flaw in the moral
"substance" of its arrangement of normatively pleasing "value" signs, but
rather in the recognition that Mobil is an oil company and that its text
occupies the aesthetic space of a corporate advertisement. Few of us are
likely to confuse the ontological status of Antigone's values with those of
a Mobil Oil ad.
But this is an easy case. It has been framed that way-precisely to
illustrate a difference between values that are ontologically deep and values
that are ontologically superficial. Although the case, as framed here, is
easy, applying the distinction remains problematic. In other contexts, such
as law review articles or legal scholarship generally, the ontological status
of values and value-talk is more controversial.
For instance, many American legal thinkers still seem to believe (at some
level) that the value-talk and the normative prescriptions of their legal
scholarship have some significant normative effect on the decisions of
courts or other official actors. As I have argued elsewhere, however, this
a priori belief in the normative efficacy of value-talk is a kind of
deformation professionelle.'7 Indeed, the normative effect of value-talk
in American legal thought does not go much further than organizing the
16. Consider this Mobil Oil ad appearing in the New York Times:
Imagine yourself and your family swept away from your past life, your job, your home, even
your homeland. What you imagine is a reality for millions of people ....
The task of resettling the world's dispossessed threatens to overwhelm the international
community. Squeezed by financial and political constraints, governments and relief agencies are
seeing their resources drained by the scale and complexity of the problem. What can we do as
American citizens and corporations?
One answer is to ....
MOBIL
N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1988, at A31.
17. See Schlag, supra note 12.
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arrangement of normatively pleasing signs in a way that fashions norma-
tively self-flattering modes of self-presentation for its authors and readers.
In short, the normative effect of value-talk in the academy does not go
much further than sustaining a mode of discourse that enables those who
transact in "law" to do so while representing themselves as engaged in a
morally or politically admirable enterprise. In turn, this professional self-
representation does not have much more ontological depth than the self-
representations of Mobil Oil in its advertisements.
It would be useful, then, to begin understanding 'value-talk in American
legal thought as a mode of advertising-advertising for the institutions,
devices, and techniques of "law." One would then understand that "values"
are related to these institutions, devices, and techniques of law in the same
ambiguous ways as in any other kind of commercial advertising. From this
perspective, the project of participating in legal thought to advance moral
or political "values" would be on the same order (and just as promising) as
trying to advance moral or political values by securing employment with
an advertising firm. In short, it would be a category mistake-a particular-
ly profound category mistake.
From the perspective of value-talk, these points are, of course, very
difficult to grasp. In part, that is because value-talk presupposes its own
ontological depth. And ironically, it is precisely because value-talk
presupposes its own ontological depth that it can easily become an
ontologically superficial enterprise--one where values are professed,
refined, exchanged, ranked, reconceptualized, and recycled in a carnival of
PR images. This is, of course, precisely what the Mobil ad illustrates: the
appropriation of moral and political value signs for ends of self-promotion.
II. THE PERFORMATIVE ROLES OF VALUES
Closely associated with the ontological status of values and value-talk is
a question about their performative roles. It is one thing to deal with
values as rigorously defined concepts-the sort of brittle artifacts one
encounters in the most arid analytical philosophy. It is another thing to
deal with values as totems of social institutions. And it is still another
thing to deal with values as motivational orientations in guilt and shame
complexes.
To say that values can be concepts, motivational orientations, or totems
is to recognize that, in any given context, "values," or any given "value,"
can have a different ontological status. And, of course, "values" do not in
and of themselves reveal their own ontological status. The value sign
"justice," for instance, can play the role of concept, image, ideal, motiva-
tion, totem, icon, affect, coercive device (and so on).
Precisely because "justice" may have a different ontological status in
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instance, that the concept "justice" is used to persuade or justify, that the
totem "justice" is used to identify or organize a political grouping, and that
the motivational orientation "justice" is used to shame certain parties into
performing or not performing certain actions. But it would be a serious
mistake to conflate or confuse the various performative roles played by
"justice," the concept, "justice," the totem, and "justice," the motivational
orientation. And indeed, there is no particular reason to believe that justice
as a concept means or is organized or operates in exactly the same way as
"justice" as a motivational affective orientation or in the same way as
"justice" as a totem. There is no reason to suppose transitivity among these
ontological modal forms. Thus, it remains a question what relations hold
among "justice" as a concept, "justice" as a totem, and "justice" as
motivational orientation.
It is important to ask these questions about the performative role of
values and value-talk because the identity of their roles cannot be
determined a priori. And merely because values as artifacts are constituted
as context-transcending, regulative grounds does not mean that they
necessarily or usually or even often play those roles. Indeed, there is no
a priori reason to believe that representations (say, fairness or God) govern
in a self-determining way the practices in which their names are regularly
invoked (court proceedings or holy war, respectively).
Like God, values feature in many roles. Values can serve as the
mediations in conversations. Values can also be media for the advance-
ment of interests unrelated to the moral, political, or aesthetic charge of the
values. They can be a form of compensation for and escapism from a
degraded reality.' 8 Values and value-talk can operate as a form of
collective denial, a way of not taking into account the social or historical
situation." Values and value-talk can operate as vehicles of coercion,
guilt, or shame. Values and value-talk can be a way of arresting troubling
and disturbing inquiries. And in turn, all of these performative roles can,
depending on the situation and the perspective, themselves be (however
problematic such a determination might be) morally appealing, morally
unappealing, or some combination of the two.
Viewed from the perspective of value-talk, values are typically seen as
extremely valuable. They tend to play very good roles. I do not want to
18. See Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal
Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1991); Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 167 (1990).
19. I have suggested elsewhere that the value-talk of the legal academy accomplishes very little in
the way of realizing its prescriptions. That is not to say that the value-talk of the legal academy is
without effect. On the contrary, some of its effects are to idealize and legitimate the activities of courts
(whatever they may be doing) and to rehearse an intellectually impoverished and deadening social
aesthetic built around the relatively autonomous subject, and other aesthetic presuppositions associated
with rationalist forms of thought. See generally Schlag, supra note 12; Schlag, supra note 18.
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dispute that values can indeed play those roles some of the time. But the
characteristic presupposition of value-talk (both in analytical moral
philosophy and American jurisprudence) is that these valued roles are
somehow fundamental, primary, or essential to values-while the less
seemly uses of value-talk are a kind of "abuse."2 This kind of aesthetic
frame-this normatively loaded aesthetic frame-is not a prerequisite for
thinking about values or how they are used. It is, however, a prerequisite
for engaging in value-talk.
In and of itself, there is nothing wrong with this sort of disciplinary
freeze framing of identities; nothing wrong, of course, so long as we
remember not to equate the world established in value-talk with our own.
Before we do make such an equation, it would be necessary to ask the
ontological and the performative questions.
III. VALUE SECTION 2.1
In order to ascertain the ontological status and the performative role of
"values" in any given context, it is necessary to examine the relations
between values on the one hand, and the practices and discourses in which
they are invoked on the other.21 Now, of course, to the extent that one
begins from a position committed to the sanctity of values as values, this
examination will not go too far. The point is obvious: one cannot inquire
into the ontological status or the performative role of God simply by asking
him what he (or his representatives) think about the matter.
It is important to ask these questions about the ontological status and the
performative role of values. As an example, consider some prescriptions
from the recent McRate Report, The Statement of Fundamental Lawyering
Skills and Professional Values of the ABA Task Force on Law Schools and
the Profession:
Value Section 2: Striving to Promote Justice, Fairness, and
Morality.
As a member of a profession that bears special responsibility
for the quality of justice, a lawyer should be committed to the
values of:
2.1 Promoting Justice, Fairness and Morality in
One's Own Daily Practice22
In one sense, this section seems really quite moral. It has lots of moral
value signs packed in, and they all sound good. But bracket, for one
moment, the normative allure of Section 2.1 and consider a matter of
20. Nussbaum, supra note 4, at 216.
21. Id. at 217.
22. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT: AN
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aesthetics. Consider for one moment the mediations deployed between
"lawyers" on the one hand, and "justice," "fairness," and "morality" on the
other. Notice that according to section 2.1, a lawyer need not actually do
anything to promote justice, fairness, or morality. He or she need only be
committed. What is more, the lawyer need not be committed to justice,
fairness, or morality. He or she need only be committed to the values of
promoting justice, etc. Finally, he or she need not be committed to the
values of justice, fairness, or morality in themselves, but must only be
committed to the values of promoting justice, fairness, and morality.
When we get to the ABA's actual discussion of this section, we find not
only discussion, but further limitations on this commitment to promoting
certain selected values. I am referring specifically to subsections 2.1(a),
2.1(b), and 2.1(c), which read as follows:
As a member of a profession that bears special responsibilities
for the quality of justice [citations omitted], a lawyer should be
committed to the values of:
2.1. Promoting Justice, Fairness and Morality in One's Own
Daily Practice, including:
(a) To the extent required or permitted by the
ethical rules of the profession, acting in conformance
with considerations of justice, fairness and morality
when making decisions or acting on behalf of a client
(see Skill Section 6.1(a)(iii)(B) supra);
(b) To the extent required or permitted by the
ethical rules of the profession, counseling clients to
take considerations of justice, fairness and morality
into account when the client makes decisions or
engages in conduct that may have an adverse effect
on other individuals or on society (see Skill Section
6.1(a)(iii)(A) supra);
(c) Treating other people (including clients, other
attorneys, and support personnel) with dignity and
respect.
23
While it is tempting to explore further this excruciatingly objectivist
representation of values, such an exercise is not necessary. It is not
necessary because the ontological superficiality of this representation of
values is obvious. Indeed, in the context of actual legal practice-a
practice that is almost always success-oriented, invariably strategic, and
relentlessly coercive-it does not seem that this recommendation is likely
to accomplish very much in the way of actually promoting justice, morality,
or fairness. So what are these values doing here? And why recommend
these values?
23. Id. at 213.
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Here they are-subsectioned, limited by exceptions and cross-references,
sliced and diced, cut and pasted-a complex formulaic schedule of
objectivist labels and formulae reminiscent of a statutory code. Of course,
one could give a traditional normative argument criticizing this particular
kind of value-talk, presenting normative reasons why this form of
objectivist representation of values is ethically or morally deficient. But
that would miss the point. The point is not to render a moral or ethical
judgment on our ways of talking about values, but rather to achieve an
appreciation of the aesthetic inadequacy of the way in which this talk of
"values" is conducted. The point is not to formulate a "reason," an
"objection," or an "argument," but to develop an aesthetic capacity, an
intellectual competency, a quality of mind,24 to appreciate the utterly
degraded form of life exemplified in the McRate report's re-presentation of
values.
We have returned to the observation with which this essay began: values
are constituted by being severed from their generative history. In Section
2.1, "values" are a technocratic aggregation of feel-good signs linked
together in a happy-talk jurisprudence that is almost completely removed
from any act of valuation or any generative history. Having been stripped
of any generative history, these "values" in Section 2.1 mean virtually
nothing at all. They are simply the simulation of moral concern or ethical
commitment.
Once emancipated from their generative history, values tend to become
the ethical equivalent of currency---endlessly recyclable, ready for
appropriation by any force, ready to underwrite any end. The identities of
values become uncertain, their roles indiscriminate. But this is.
IV. POETIC JUSTICE
And it should not surprise. What else is to be expected of an enterprise
that seeks to sever itself from its own history and forget that history?
Value-talk, as it is practiced in so much analytical moral philosophy and
American jurisprudence, is very much that project. Now that values have
become radically emancipated from their generative history, it surely cannot
surprise that values should be ontologically insecure, prone to identity
crises and indiscriminate use.
Some thinkers apparently believe that we must shrink from such
realizations, for they put our whole normative universe and our political
projects in question. But it is only a frightened or weary perspective that
confuses putting something at risk-life, values, anything-with its
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devaluation. 25 That frightened and weary perspective--call it "nihilism"
or, at this point, call it "law"-is the one that knows how to question its
gods, its values, but dares not do so for fear of confronting a loss it knows,
on some level, has already occurred.
25. See ironically JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1974). In striking contrast to many of his late-
twentieth-century academic descendants, this great liberal was keenly aware of the dire results of failing
to challenge comfortably held ideas:
[E]ven if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and
actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held
in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds. And not
only this, but ... the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost or enfeebled,
and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct; the dogma becoming a mere formal
profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground and preventing the growth of any
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